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This article is part of a series of Policy Issues articles on the 2012 Farm Bill. You can also find articles on The 
Environment of the Next Farm Bill Debate, External Factors That Will Drive the Next Farm Bill Debate, Farm Bill 
Stakeholders: Competitors or Collaborators?, and Food and Nutrition Programs in the Next Farm Bill as part of this 
theme. 
Trade conditions provide an important part of the economic environment in which the 2012 Farm Bill will be debated. 
Among these conditions are the health of the world economy, the strength of the dollar, the path of world commodity 
prices, and the situation in energy markets. In addition, the political and diplomatic activities resulting in trade 
disputes, negotiations, and agreements will also be a factor in the prospects for expanding markets overseas and the 
degree of competition faced by U.S. farmers at home and abroad. These elements will provide the backdrop for the 
domestic legislative process even if not directly reflected in the bill itself. 
This article offers a perspective on the international aspects of the environment in which the farm bill will be decided. 
The emphasis will be on issues related to world agricultural trade, trade agreements, trade disputes, and international 
standards. These matters are at least, in part, subject to sensible speculation. The rate of growth in the world 
economy over the life of the next Farm Bill, and the fate of the dollar over that period, are matters for metaphysical 
conjecture as much as economic analysis. 
World Agricultural Markets 
The past five years has seen a remarkable amount of volatility in world agricultural and food markets, as well as in 
commodity and energy markets. Not since the 1970s has there been such a series of price surges driven by real or 
anticipated shortages. Stocks have been inadequate to smooth markets, and futures markets have on occasions 
added to instability rather than dampening market volatility. These issues have received high-level attention, 
appearing on the agenda for meetings of the world’s political leaders. Intergovernmental institutions have been called 
upon to monitor and report on the twin issues of food security and price instability. And beneath the surface are 
concerns about the capacity of the world’s agricultural and food system to meet the future demands of an expanding 
global population. If output fails to keep up with growing demand, then relative prices of foodstuffs will rise, reversing 
the trend for the last four decades of the twentieth century. 
This period of instability and concern about future food security has been reflected in the ongoing debates about 
domestic farm and food policy. At one level it has led to proclamations that support for farmers in developed 
countries, such as the United States and Europe, should be continued for the purposes of ensuring that supplies are 
adequate in the future. So far, this argument has not achieved much traction: during a period of high prices it is less 
easy to make the case that farmers require subsidies in order to stay in business. So the more constructive aspects 
of the discussion have been on the impact of price instability on hunger and the need to absorb some of risks 
inherent in farming. 
With respect to the impact of food prices on hunger, it should be emphasized that the United States has in place a 
massive program of food assistance, now called the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) and 
formerly known as the Food Stamp program that reaches over 40 million consumers. Its cost is currently estimated at 
$75.3 billion for 2011, a sum that accounts for over 75% of the Farm Program costs. But the United States also is 
involved in assistance to overseas consumers. The Food Aid budget runs at $2.8 billion each year and the President has launched a Feed the Future initiative that aims to help developing countries institute their own solutions to food 
insecurity. These programs cost more when prices are high, but are also subject to being cut at times of budget 
stringency and they face scrutiny in the multinational trade negotiations. 
To the extent that domestic markets in many countries are now closely connected with world markets, instability of 
farm product prices can pose serious problems for farmers. Each country has its own remedy for this. In the United 
States, crop insurance has become a major component of the “safety net” as price supports such as loan deficiency 
and countercyclical payments recede in importance. In the EU, the consolidated “single farm payments” act as a 
stable income source enabling farmers to take risks in adapting to market openings. Though questions remain about 
the distribution of such payments, there is no move to curtail them at this time. 
In addition to influencing the terms of the domestic debate, world prices influence US agriculture, and thus the context 
for the Farm Bill, through export performance. US exports have been growing rapidly in the past few years, providing 
much needed income at a time when domestic sales were flagging. This year the value of exports is expected to be 
over $135 billion (USDA, 2011). The current expansive situation depends however on the continuation of the growth 
of the global economy, particularly the larger emerging economies such as India, China, and Brazil. 
Growing demand for food in other countries does not guarantee expansion of U.S. farm exports. The competitiveness 
of such exports is determined in part by developments abroad but in part by domestic policy decisions and economic 
conditions. Competition from Argentina and Brazil for crops, as well as Australia and New Zealand for livestock 
products, has intensified in the past decade, though medium term currency movements often hide changes in 
underlying costs. Fuel and fertilizer costs have also become significant constraints for U.S. farmers as they expand 
exports, though many of these cost increases are shared with competitors. 
Among the domestic policy determinants of competition are the costs associated with regulations. The farm sector 
has become concerned about the expansion of regulations relating to dust and air pollution, ground water 
contamination and greenhouse gas emissions. The issue has taken on a political dimension that makes resolution 
more difficult. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken the brunt of the criticism, and is often seen as 
being less than sympathetic to farm concerns. The EPA, as with other agencies, is vulnerable to cuts in the 
appropriation of funds to operate its programs. 
Perhaps the most significant impact of world prices on U.S. farm policy is manifest through the budget available for 
farm programs. When world prices are high, spending on farm programs declines. One might think that this would be 
welcomed, as the opposition to such programs would be muted. But the baseline for future programs is also reduced, 
limiting the funds that would be available in a subsequent period of low prices. Much of the farm bill debate is about 
spending priorities—such as between commodity programs, crop insurance, conservation and food stamps—with the 
amount of expenditure available being in part a function of world price developments. If farm program proponents 
become convinced that the world is likely to experience high commodity prices for the next decade or so, then direct 
payments that are not price-linked may be the preferred instrument. If the feeling is that farm prices are likely to fall 
back in a year or two, then price-linked payments and insurance instruments would be more attractive. 
The Doha Round 
The WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations has staggered on for close to a decade. The agricultural talks have been 
largely, though not entirely, responsible for the slow progress. Other areas of the talks, such as tariffs on 
manufactured goods and further opening up of service sectors, were virtually neglected for the first years of the 
negotiations. As a result, the crafting of a “package” acceptable to all WTO members has so far proved impossible. In 
agriculture, the main issues have been the depth of tariff cuts for farm products, the elimination of export subsidies 
and the tightening of the allowable limits of trade-distorting domestic support (WTO, 2008). Currently the agricultural 
talks are virtually complete with only a small number of items where tough political decisions will have to be made. In 
the meantime, trade officials are considering what limited agreements could be reached in December 2011 to ensure 
that the Round does not grind to a complete halt. 
For agriculture the outcome of the Doha Round, if agreement can eventually be reached, can be assessed with some 
degree of confidence. Translating that into actual impacts on particular markets or trade flows is much more difficult 
because that requires speculation on the actions of other countries and the reactions of competitors. 
One certain outcome is that export prospects for the major U.S. farm and food sectors are likely to improve steadily if 
not dramatically with the conclusion of the Round. The most significant aspect of the agricultural talks is that of 
market access. The Uruguay Round provided a more transparent basis for trade negotiations by obliging the conversion of virtually all non-tariff trade measures into tariffs. However, the cuts in those newly bound tariffs were 
minimal, 36% on average for developed countries, but, in effect, rather less. The Doha Round would cut developed 
country agricultural tariffs by 50-70%, with the higher cuts applied to higher tariffs (Martin and Mattoo, 2011). 
However, countries could designate up to 4% of tariff lines as “sensitive” and compensate for smaller tariff cuts by 
offering more reduced tariff rate quotas (TRQs). Though this would modify the impact of tariff cuts, it would not offset 
their effect entirely: the minimum average cut across products would have to be 54%. 
Somewhat less ambitious cuts are likely to be made in tariffs in developing countries. Part of this is a result of the fact 
that WTO negotiations center on bound, or maximum, duty rates rather than the applied rates that are often much 
lower. Developing importing countries prefer to keep high bound rates, enabling them to raise tariffs if circumstances 
require. Exporters seek to lower these bound rates even when there is little immediate impact on market access. In 
addition, the bound rates apply to non-preferred suppliers: most countries are members of one or more preferential 
regional or bilateral trade pacts that have reduced or eliminated tariffs among themselves. In these cases, reductions 
in bound tariffs may still not be enough to make nonpreferred suppliers competitive. In spite of all these caveats, 
developing country tariffs on agricultural products will be reduced in a Doha agreement, though by a maximum of 
36% on average. 
As with most trade negotiations, tariff reductions are reciprocal. The United States has a significant market that other 
countries wish to supply. U.S. imports of agricultural goods are estimated to be about $88 billion this year. Tariffs on 
imported agricultural and food products are generally low, but some product markets are still protected by significant 
tariffs and TRQs. From the viewpoint of the Farm Bill, a cut in tariffs for sugar and dairy would restrict the ability of 
domestic policy to maintain high prices. Dairy producers are already contemplating an alternative policy and sugar 
producers have been under notice for some years that this program may eventually be wound up. Lower tariffs and 
expanded TRQs, if the United States were to designate these commodities as sensitive, would increase the pressure 
for change. 
Though less immediately significant in terms of trade expansion, the constraints on export subsidies are of systemic 
importance. Export subsidies were limited in the Uruguay Round, but it was not until the Doha Round that their 
elimination became politically possible to negotiate. The EU has been the major user of export subsidies for the past 
few years, and the United States’ export enhancement programs have largely been phased out or made consistent 
with WTO rules. One export program that could be affected, however, is food aid. The United States is a significant 
contributor to in-kind programs that are based on U.S. products and that allow recipient governments and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to sell the products in the marketplace. Other food aid donors prefer cash 
contributions that allow recipient governments to purchase supplies from the most convenient source, often a country 
in their own region. The Doha restraints on food aid will not cut the provision of emergency aid or hunger relief efforts, 
but may make the United States change its distribution policies. 
The constraints put on domestic farm support programs by the Uruguay Round were major steps towards limiting the 
use of subsidies that distort trade. As the major champion of this approach, the United States saw it as a way of 
keeping the EU and other developed countries from undercutting market access gains with domestic subsidies. The 
Doha Round provides an opportunity to scale back all price-related programs to 20-30% of their current limits. The 
projections for the United States, Japan and the EU are for domestic support payments to be below these new Doha 
limits; but, in the case of the United States, the picture could change with sharply lower world prices (Orden, 
Blandford and Josling, 2011). For U.S. agriculture, the question is whether to take the risk that U.S. policy spending 
on price-related programs may be constrained in the future in order to get the assurance that competitors cannot 
increase their own spending on such programs. 
One important product that has given a boost to U.S. corn prices, and land prices, in recent years is not subject to the 
same WTO disciplines in the Doha Round. Ethanol is classified as an agricultural product, but the U.S. “special duty” 
on ethanol imports is not included in the agricultural tariff schedule that would be subject to cuts in the Doha Round. 
And the subsidies to ethanol—the volumetric tax credit given to blenders to encourage them to use ethanol and meet 
Congressional mandates—are not included in the domestic support that would be subject to reduction. The issue of 
subsidies that encourage consumption have not been a concern in the past in trade rules. But the concerns about the 
impact of biofuel mandates on food prices have led to a reconsideration of this neglect.  
Bilateral Agreements 
The languid pace of the WTO Doha Round is in contrast to the almost frantic activity in the last decade as countries 
signed some 200 more limited trade agreements on regional or bilateral levels. These agreements have often been 
dismissed as being of little interest in opening up agricultural markets because countries made certain, through 
quotas and long transition periods, that their domestic farm sectors were not immediately threatened. But the long transition periods are coming to an end and only the most sensitive agricultural sectors have been granted continued 
exemption (Josling, 2009a). The enthusiasm for these preferential trade pacts ebbs and flows, but their cumulative 
impact is beginning to be a major factor in agricultural markets. 
In the United States, the spate of small-but-interesting bilateral agreements came to a halt after the adoption of the 
Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and the inclusion in that agreement of the Dominican Republic. The 
last three agreements negotiated by the previous Administration—with Korea, Colombia, and Panama—still await 
Congressional approval. The agreement with Panama is of relatively small significance for agriculture, but would 
bring some political benefits in the region. That with Colombia is of greater benefit for U.S. agriculture, in particular 
because some competitors have recently been granted access to that market. Korea is the biggest prize, but again 
U.S. agriculture could find itself with less free access than competitors if the agreement is not ratified soon. At present 
there is a disagreement as to whether to link the passage of all three agreements to extension of adjustment 
assistance for workers whose jobs might be displaced. But it still seems likely that the trade pacts will be ratified 
within this calendar year. 
The latest set of trade negotiations has the most potential for future export growth. In May 2006, four countries—New 
Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei—formed an informal group to promote free trade in the Pacific region. Two 
years later the United States indicated a willingness to join this coalition, and this led to the inclusion of Australia, 
Peru, and Vietnam in the talks on an expanded free trade agreement. The initiative was renamed the Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP) and nine countries—including Malaysia—are currently in negotiations. The aim 
is to eliminate all tariffs within 12 years, with 90% of trade being free after the first year. The significance of this move 
is in its value as a framework for others to join. It is seen as a complement to the “unilateral” approach of the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process that emerged 10 years ago.  Agricultural trade would be among the 
most significant aspect of such an agreement, if progress continues to be made. 
Trade Conflicts 
Negotiating a trade agreement implies a commitment to reduce trade barriers and to allow more competition. Trade 
conflicts arise generally within such agreements when political pressures in one country lead to actions that appear to 
other trade partners to violate those agreements. The WTO has a strong and effective dispute settlement regime and 
many of the regional and bilateral trade agreements have similar provisions. The United States was broadly in favor 
of such provisions as a way to put pressure on large trade partners—such as the EU and Japan—to comply with 
agreed upon rules. Thus the WTO dispute settlement regime took on the task of resolving some contentious 
agricultural trade disputes that had emerged through the 1980s. But the nature of such conflicts has changed 
somewhat over the years (Josling, 2009b). Now developing countries often make use of the dispute settlement 
system when they feel that developed countries are violating the rules. The United States has been challenged by 
several countries in the WTO for aspects of domestic policy that are arguably at odds with agreed-on commitments. 
The outcomes of these cases have had a direct impact on domestic farm policy. 
This is seen most clearly in the case of cotton. Brazil successfully challenged several aspects of the policy for upland 
cotton, notably the “step 2” subsidies to processors, the export credit programs, and the price-linked payments under 
the commodity programs. Direct payments were not found to have caused “serious prejudice” to Brazilian cotton 
farmers, though the WTO panel did query their compatibility with the rules of the green box. At issue was the 
provision that prevented the cultivation of fruits, vegetables, and wild rice on land eligible for direct payments. A more 
general challenge was later mounted by both Brazil and Canada on the designation of direct payments and certain 
other subsidies as green box support. These countries claimed that with correct notification, the United States would 
have exceeded its commitment for trade-distorting support, also known as total aggregate measures of support (Total 
AMS), in several recent years. This case is ongoing, but its significance depends on whether the Doha Round is 
concluded. Other WTO cases are likely to impinge on U.S. farm policy and the writing of the Farm Bill. One of these 
is the requirement for country-of-origin labeling (COOL) that has been challenged by Canada and Mexico as an 
undue impediment to their livestock sectors (Sawka and Kerr, 2010). 
Concluding Comments 
The international economic outlook for U.S. agriculture is essentially positive. If emerging economies continue their 
impressive growth then farm and food exports should continue their strong upward trends. A conclusion of the Doha 
Round would contribute to this export expansion even though some protected sectors, such as sugar and dairy, 
would face increased competition from abroad. In addition, the completion of the Round would meet many of the 
objectives that U.S. agriculture has had over the decades, limiting high levels of domestic support in other developed 
countries and eliminating the practice of subsidizing exports. It would be somewhat perverse if these desirable outcomes were to be ignored in favor of keeping a little more flexibility for domestic policy. But perversity is not 
unknown in the area of farm policy. 
Ratification of the three pending trade agreements would also confirm the willingness of the United States to pursue a 
policy of open markets in farm goods. The agreements with Colombia and Panama would fit in with a hemispheric 
approach to trade policy aimed at countering competition from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in the region. Ratification 
of the agreement with Korea would have more significant trade implications and could be the turning point in the 
Asian region, where agricultural trade liberalization still meets strong resistance. 
But how significantly the conclusion of the Doha Round and a ratification of the three bilateral agreements would 
influence the farm bill is less than clear. The Doha Round would certainly put additional constraints on trade-distorting 
subsidies, but the new rules might only be felt if world prices were to collapse. The nature of export policies, including 
export credits and food aid, would have to adjust, but this may have been the direction of policy in any case. Tariffs 
would be reduced, but these are not generally decided as part of the farm bill. So the direct impact of a Doha 
conclusion is not so much on the 2012 Farm Bill as on the nature of the world market onto which the United States 
sells so much in the way of products. Whether these benefits will be enough to convince the agricultural sector to 
support multilateral trade liberalization is not certain. Farmers cannot “take to the bank” trade agreements that 
promise the ability to compete for somewhat larger markets in future years. But combined with market expansion 
through income and population growth, reduced trade barriers would be an important guarantee that countries could 
not slam the door on imports when domestic pressures mount. So the Doha Round and the bilateral agreements 
provide a valuable insurance policy for farmers and ease the way for a shift from income support to risk management. 
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